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Revie~s
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of brief reviews 
o~ books and articles (and perhaps films etc.) which are concerned in some way with the 
rl.ghts and wrongs of human treatment of non-human animals. These reviews will be both 
~riticnl and reportive--primarily reportive in the case of most scientific and historical 
~l~nte~ial. and increas~ngly c::itical as. the m~terial is. m<;Jre ~rgumentative and philosophical. 
lhe Becon~ part of th~s.Sect~on is ent~t~ed Second OP7n~ons and contains second (and 
usually d~ssenting) rev~ews of works rev~ewed in the f~rst part in earlier numbers of E&A. 
After a review appears i~ E&A (and after the 'second opinion' .if one appears within the-­
lIext two numbers) the Ed~tor will invite the author of the or~ginal work to submit a brief 
rejoinder t~ the review(s). Rejoinders received will appear in the third part of the 
Review Sect~on. Members of the SSEA who wish to submit reviews (first or second) or 
recommend works for review. should contact the Editor. • 
Books 
ADRIAN J. DESMOND) THE APE'S RE­
FLECTION (NEW YORK) THE DIAL PRESS/
JAMES WADE)) 1979. 
This is not just another semi-popular dis­
cussion of the linguistic abilities of pri­
mates. Desmond is a specialist in the his­
tory of evolutionary theory and a gifted 
writer whose previous book, The Hot-Blood­
ed Dinosaurs, succeeded in making palaeon­
tolcgy not only intelligible but thrilling. 
His concern with primate linguistic ability, 
in the present book, grew out of his con­
viction that "the problem had been formula­
ted :'n nonDarwinian terms". Darwin demol­
ished "the metaphysics behind The Great 
Chain of Being", Desmond believes, but that 
is widely ignored. Opponents of the idea 
that nonhumans can handle language often 
set up "language" as an honorific label 
marking the last bastion of human moral pre­
eminence. 
Why should we care somuc~ whether apes have 
"language"? Desmond thinks it undeniable 
that they have symbols, ways of represent­
ing ~he world to themselves; indeed, he goes 
so far as to assert that "every creature has 
an ijiosyncratic world view". What we ought 
to be asking, he thinks, is what the world 
is like to the ape mind. Ape partisans have 
often been too concerned to I1humanize" the 
ape. As a result, sign language I1has scar­
cely been used to tap the apels social or 
psychological reality l1. Rather, I1by fla­
grantly crediting the gorilla with the en­
tire gamut of human mental states •••weef­
fectively enslave the gorilla, robbing it 
of psychic independence and reducing it to 
human status". 
Thus, both sides of the debate have set up 
human language as a standard, and then ar­
guea that nonhuman primates do, or donlt, 
meet that standard. Desmond thinks that 
we ought rather to be asking questions like 
this: "Why do apes have this capacity for 
wielding words when they have no natural 
language? 11 We ought to be asking what 
functions in ape mentality are preadapted 
to symbol use. We ought to be treating 
speech adaptively, rather than as a 
l1universal measuring rod". We ought to be 
asking about the adaptive value of mental 
experiences. Desmond has some interesting 
suggestions about what good Darwinian an­
swers, or partial answers, to sucli ques­
tions might look like. The philosophical im-­
portance of Desmond's book, however, lies not 
in his specific answers but rather in his ar­
gument that, to a considerable extent, we are 
failing to ask Darwinian questions because we 
are still thinking in terms of The Great Chain 
of Being. As long as we think in terms of 
ascent rather than adaptation, as long as 
"Reason remains an Absolute", we will not 
only misunderstand other animals, we will mis­
understand ourselves. 
Since Desmond refuses to "deny the chimpan­
zee's sovereign existence by totally miscon­
struing Darwinian nature", one expects him 
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to have considerable sympathy with primates 
who are the victims of human curiosity or 
utility. He makes many remarks that do sug­-
gest such sympathy, and, indeed, sometimes 
writes with real moral sensitivity. Neverthe­-
less, there remains a deep puzzles about his 
moral attitude towards primates and other 
animals. He begins his first chapter by quot­-
ing psychologist Gordon Gallup's remark that 
"someday, in order to be logically consis­-
tent, man may have to seriously consider the 
applicability of his political, ethical and 
moral philosophy to chimpanzees". He returns 
to this idea several times, suggesting at one 
point that it defies "the very Darwinian 
canons which promise truly to liberate the 
ape from human value judgments". In his con­-
cluding paragraph he suggests that to extend 
"the umbrella of our ethics" to the chimpan­-
zee would "deny the chimpanzee's sovereign 
existence", as though humans were still to 
be thought of as "the measure of Creation". 
But what does it mean to extend "the um­-
brella of our ethics" to chimpanzees, or 
other animals? There are two different in­-
terpretations of this, depending upon wheth­-
er we are thinking of animals as moral agen~
(subject to blame, guilt, responsibility, 
etc.) or as moral patients (subjects of moral 
claims or rights, objects of moral obliga­-
tions, etc.). That we cannot bring our mor­-
ality unproblematically to bear upon the ape 
as agent, is surely correct. Much of what 
Desmond says suggests that this is what he 
means. We can certainly agree with his re­-
jection of "'explaining' ape behavior by 
human mores and values". But it does not 
follow that "our" morality does not apply to 
monkeys, and other animals, as patients. How 
ought we to treat them? Can we mess them up 
to satisfy our curiosity, or to please our 
palate, or to prolong our life? Can't we ask 
such questions? Can't we answer them? 
Maybe not. Desmond's last chapter is enti­-
tled, "The Mechanics of Morality". In it, he 
retails a sociobiological account of the de­-
velopment of (human) morality. On Desmond's 
view, inspired by Robert Trivers and Richard 
Dawkins, "morality is an adaptive device to 
keep reciprocating society stable for the 
distinct benefit of each member". This un­-
fortunately plunges us into all the philo­-
sophical puzzles that have formed around 
the disc~pl~ne of sociobiology during the 
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last half-decade. Evolutionary explana­-
tions of altruism, etc., seem to threaten 
to explain ethics away. "Accurately speak­-
ing," says Desmond "nature is no more a 
community of 'equals' than 'unequals'-­-
both are insupportable and meaningless 
value judgments; in respect of disparate 
creatures like Darwin's cuttlefish and 
bee, or man and worm, it is a community 
of incomparables." But this leaves us 
wondering how we ought to treat these be­-
ings who are not higher nor lower nor 
equal. Gallup wrote to Desmond that "it 
is becoming increasingly apparent that 
chimpanzees and people share basically the 
same conceptual equipment in common. How 
then do we justify keeping them behind 
bars?" Desmond's response concludes: "I 
am the first 'to uphold the chimpanzee's 
sovereign 'self', but consider that I 
would be insulting (if not untrue to Dar­-
win) if I equated this with the 'self' of 
another species." It is, no doubt, salu­-
tary to emphasize the difference between 
the chimpanzee's sovereign self and one's 
own, but we still need to know whether 
what we do to primates, and other animals, 
can be justified. (And keeping them be­-
hind bars is the least of it!) 
Desmond's difficulty in coming to grips 
with the question of how we ought to treat 
primates stems, I think, from deeper diffi­-
culties about how to fit evolution and 
-ethics together, difficulties that Desmond 
does not address in his book. Nevertheless, 
The Ape's Reflexion is a very interesting 
and very enjoyable book, one of the better 
products of the "interminable debate over 
the ape's possession of human language". 
Edward Johnson 
University of New Orleans 
